The Cartesian CircleReading Descartes, slowly

Discourse on the Method, Part II

Four rules, and why only four

Notes from our session on the second part of the Discourse.

By the time Descartes sat down to describe his method, he had spent years among people who knew a great deal of logic. He was not impressed. The syllogism, he writes, is good for explaining to others what one already knows, not for finding anything new; and a long list of rules, like a long list of laws, mostly gives people more opportunities to break them. A state is better governed, he says, with a few laws strictly kept.

So he gives himself four, and resolves never to fail to observe them even once:

  1. Evidence. Never to accept anything as true that I did not plainly know to be so; to avoid haste and prejudice, and to include in my judgements nothing more than what presented itself to my mind so clearly and distinctly that I had no occasion to doubt it.
  2. Division. To divide each of the difficulties I examined into as many parts as possible, and as might be required to resolve them better.
  3. Order. To conduct my thoughts in order, beginning with the simplest objects and the easiest to know, and rising little by little, as by steps, to knowledge of the most complex — even supposing an order among things that do not naturally follow one another.
  4. Enumeration. Throughout, to make enumerations so complete and reviews so general that I could be sure of leaving nothing out.

Read quickly, the list looks like common sense. Several of us said as much. What makes it less obvious is the word never in the first rule. Descartes is not asking us to be careful; he is asking us to give our assent only to what we cannot doubt, which turns out, two parts later, to be very little indeed.

Where the rules come from

The model is explicitly mathematical. Descartes says that the long chains of simple reasoning geometers use to reach their most difficult demonstrations made him think that everything people can know follows in the same way. The second and third rules are the procedure of the Geometry published alongside the Discourse: reduce a hard problem to simple equations, then build up the answer step by step.

We spent some time on the clause at the end of the third rule — supposing an order even where there is none. One reading is that order is something the inquirer brings to the material, not something found in it. Another, more modest, is that it is simply a practical tip: if you cannot see where to start, pick an arbitrary starting point and be consistent.

The fourth rule is the hardest

Complete enumeration sounds like bookkeeping. In practice it is the rule we break most, because it asks us to check that we have considered every case before concluding. Descartes himself was not always good at it, as his objectors were happy to point out.

N’y ayant qu’une vérité de chaque chose, quiconque la trouve en sait autant qu’on en peut savoir.For there is only one truth of each thing, and whoever finds it knows as much about it as can be known. — Part II

For next time

Part III, the “provisional morality”: what do you live by while you are still doubting everything? It is the most practical part of the book and the one people quote least.