The Cartesian CircleReading Descartes, slowly

Meditations on First Philosophy, II

What the piece of wax teaches

Notes from our session on the second half of the Second Meditation.

The Second Meditation has just reached its famous result: I am, I exist, at least for as long as I am thinking. But the meditator is uneasy. It still seems that bodies, which I can see and touch, are known far more distinctly than this “I” that I cannot picture at all. So Descartes takes the simplest body he can find.

A piece of wax has just been taken from the honeycomb. It has not lost all the taste of the honey; it keeps something of the scent of the flowers it was gathered from. Its colour, shape and size are plain to see; it is hard and cold, easy to handle, and if you rap it with a knuckle it makes a sound. Everything we could ask for in knowing a body distinctly seems to be there.

Then it is brought near the fire. The taste goes, the smell vanishes, the colour changes, the shape is lost, the size grows; it becomes liquid and hot, can hardly be touched, and no longer makes a sound when struck. Does the same wax remain? Everyone agrees that it does. So what was it about the wax that we knew so distinctly? None of the things the senses reported, since all of those have changed.

Not the senses, and not the imagination

What remains is something extended, flexible and changeable. But the wax can take more shapes than I could ever run through in imagination, so it is not the imagination that grasps it either. The conclusion is that the wax is perceived by the mind alone — solius mentis inspectio — an inspection that can be confused or clear depending on how carefully one attends.

The point of the episode is turned back on the meditator. If I judge that the wax exists because I see it, it follows even more evidently that I exist, since I could not seem to see anything without thinking. Every perception of a body is also, and more certainly, evidence of the mind that perceives it.

The men in the street

The passage everyone in our group remembered is the shortest. Looking out of the window, I say I see men crossing the square, just as I say I see the wax. But what do I actually see except hats and coats, which could cover automata? I judge that they are men. What I thought I saw with my eyes, I grasp in fact by the faculty of judgement in my mind.

We argued about whether this proves too much. If every perception involves a judgement, the senses never deliver anything that is simply given. Some of us found that liberating, others found it a slippery slope to the evil demon of the First Meditation, which is perhaps exactly where Descartes wants us to stand.

Cognosco nihil facilius aut evidentius mea mente posse a me percipi.I know that nothing can be perceived by me more easily or more evidently than my own mind. — Second Meditation, AT VII 34